What should our federation look like? This question came after the Johor Regent Tunku Ismail Sultan Ibrahim called for Johor to be treated as an equal partner of the federation.
This is an important question that should be considered, especially by the critics of Tunku Ismail’s statement.
Malaysia’s federal system traces back to the peninsula’s pre-colonial era, comprising distinct Malay states ruled by a sultan. British colonisation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries further solidified these divisions by recognising the states as separate legal entities. Despite British attempts at centralisation in the 1930s, strong objections from the Malay rulers prevented complete consolidation.
After World War II, pan-Malaya political organisations emerged. In 1946, the British proposed the Malayan Union (MU), which aimed to centralise administration across British Malaya and grant liberal citizenship rights to all residents, including immigrant Chinese and Indians. However, Malay aristocrats rallied opposition to the MU, leading to the formation of UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) and ethnic mobilisation.
UMNO evolved into a pan-Malayan ethno-nationalist party, transcending state loyalties. The Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 replaced the MU proposal, emphasising Malay pre-eminence while accommodating non-Malay immigrants within a federal constitution. Thus, the resulting countervailing mobilisation and the political parties that the non-Malays formed were pan-Malayan in nature. This followed naturally from the political contest for incorporating particular ethnic interests into a federal constitution that was finally adopted in 1957, following a contest that focused attention on the federal level of government.
Subsequently, this centralised federalism was further morphed and reinforced by the long-term control of the central government and most states by the Umno-BN party since Independence. The prolonged dominance of Umno-BN in Malaysia led to a politicised bureaucracy that became an extension of the ruling party, losing neutrality and professionalism. This resulted in hostility towards the Opposition, even after they won control of state governments in Kelantan, Perak, Kedah, Penang, and Selangor in 2008. The upper echelon of the civil service, appointed by federal authorities and crucial for state administration, needed to be more cooperative with the new state governments. Consequently, the Opposition prioritised appointing neutral top civil servants upon the retirement or transfer of pro-BN officers. Federal supervisory bodies like the National Land Council, National Finance Council, and National Council for Local Government, chaired by the Prime Minister, infringed on state jurisdictions. In 2010, when Penang and Selangor sought to hold local government elections, the Election Commission deferred to the National Council for Local Government, highlighting the federal encroachment on state rights.
Yet, given the rising share of state revenue channelled to the federal government, why are there still long-standing complaints over unequal development of public services in the country, especially outside the Klang Valley?
The federation right now is less than ideal. For example, the total consolidated state government revenues (in absolute terms) for all the states have risen since 1985. Yet, the average annual growth rate of state government revenue growth between 1995 and 2000 was only about 4.9%. However, the average growth rate of consolidated state government revenue from 2000 to 2005 declined to approximately 2.5%, indicating that the state government’s capacity for revenue collection had diminished. However, the average growth rate of consolidated state government revenue from 2000 to 2005 declined to approximately 2.5%, indicating that the state government’s capacity for revenue collection had diminished. Meanwhile, the average annual growth of federal government revenue rose from about 4.4% for 1995-2000 to 14.4% for 2000-2005.
But this is only one aspect of the problem arising from our centralisation of power. The politicisation of the bureaucracy resulted in a partisan bureaucracy and one that was highly territorial. Hence, the displacement of Umno-BN in Penang and Selangor in 2008, for instance, did not automatically result in a more ‘competent, accountable and transparent’ (or CAT) government, the proclaimed goal of these two new Pakatan Rakyat (PR) state governments. The relationship between the Opposition-led state governments and the federal departments of Education, Consumer Affairs, MIDA, and even Health, Tourism, Culture and Welfare based in the states remained tense after the change of state governments. For example, the lightning speed with which the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, a federal agency, conducted itself vis-Ã -vis allegations of corruption among PR politicians is a reminder of this polarisation between the federal and the state authorities (more on this in Part Four). Meanwhile, state governments have also boycotted activities organised by the federal departments. Since the federal departments have access to more funds than their state counterparts, they often manage their functions and projects to outdo those conducted by the latter, often in the same areas.
Even under the Madani government, the effects of these rivalries or silos often affect the common man. For Johor, the most prominent remains the standstill jams that usually happen at the Causeway crossings –which the Federal Government has repeatedly said it would resolve.
For the average Causeway crosser, relief has come in the form of the regular checkpoint visits by Menteri Besar Datuk Onn Hafiz, whose frequent inspections often resolve congestions for the day with common sense solutions – such as machinery blocking one of the motorcycle immigration lanes.
Yet, how has the civil service responded? KPISM president Ajeet Singh Gurbax Singh praised Onn Hafiz’s efforts for often visiting BSI and the Kompleks Sultan Abu Bakar (KSAB) in Gelang Patah to see the situation for himself but also said Onn Hafiz also needs to focus on the state’s people issues, especially involving the B40 group.
These complaints are because some union members feel uneasy about issues not being within Menteri Besar’s jurisdiction.
Tunku Ismail's arguments for greater autonomy and resources for Johor have cause—one has to look at the headlines to see why Johor has asked for more funds to resolve longstanding issues with public infrastructure and services, as seen with Hospital Sultanah Aminah and the roads in Johor.
This point about decentralisation is familiar. Penang (which coincidentally followed Johor’s move to request more revenue be retained by the state) was one of its great champions even before the Madani administration.
Critics of decentralisation have often pointed to the Constitution, but the Constitution itself is a living document—and given the material reality of state development, there is reason to consider how we should approach the federation.
The demands made by Tunku Ismail Sultan Ibrahim were necessary not only for the state of Johor but also for many other states facing the same problems. It is time to tweak the Federal-state power-sharing concept.
This is an important question that should be considered, especially by the critics of Tunku Ismail’s statement.
After World War II, pan-Malaya political organisations emerged. In 1946, the British proposed the Malayan Union (MU), which aimed to centralise administration across British Malaya and grant liberal citizenship rights to all residents, including immigrant Chinese and Indians. However, Malay aristocrats rallied opposition to the MU, leading to the formation of UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) and ethnic mobilisation.
UMNO evolved into a pan-Malayan ethno-nationalist party, transcending state loyalties. The Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 replaced the MU proposal, emphasising Malay pre-eminence while accommodating non-Malay immigrants within a federal constitution. Thus, the resulting countervailing mobilisation and the political parties that the non-Malays formed were pan-Malayan in nature. This followed naturally from the political contest for incorporating particular ethnic interests into a federal constitution that was finally adopted in 1957, following a contest that focused attention on the federal level of government.
Subsequently, this centralised federalism was further morphed and reinforced by the long-term control of the central government and most states by the Umno-BN party since Independence. The prolonged dominance of Umno-BN in Malaysia led to a politicised bureaucracy that became an extension of the ruling party, losing neutrality and professionalism. This resulted in hostility towards the Opposition, even after they won control of state governments in Kelantan, Perak, Kedah, Penang, and Selangor in 2008. The upper echelon of the civil service, appointed by federal authorities and crucial for state administration, needed to be more cooperative with the new state governments. Consequently, the Opposition prioritised appointing neutral top civil servants upon the retirement or transfer of pro-BN officers. Federal supervisory bodies like the National Land Council, National Finance Council, and National Council for Local Government, chaired by the Prime Minister, infringed on state jurisdictions. In 2010, when Penang and Selangor sought to hold local government elections, the Election Commission deferred to the National Council for Local Government, highlighting the federal encroachment on state rights.
Yet, given the rising share of state revenue channelled to the federal government, why are there still long-standing complaints over unequal development of public services in the country, especially outside the Klang Valley?
The federation right now is less than ideal. For example, the total consolidated state government revenues (in absolute terms) for all the states have risen since 1985. Yet, the average annual growth rate of state government revenue growth between 1995 and 2000 was only about 4.9%. However, the average growth rate of consolidated state government revenue from 2000 to 2005 declined to approximately 2.5%, indicating that the state government’s capacity for revenue collection had diminished. However, the average growth rate of consolidated state government revenue from 2000 to 2005 declined to approximately 2.5%, indicating that the state government’s capacity for revenue collection had diminished. Meanwhile, the average annual growth of federal government revenue rose from about 4.4% for 1995-2000 to 14.4% for 2000-2005.
But this is only one aspect of the problem arising from our centralisation of power. The politicisation of the bureaucracy resulted in a partisan bureaucracy and one that was highly territorial. Hence, the displacement of Umno-BN in Penang and Selangor in 2008, for instance, did not automatically result in a more ‘competent, accountable and transparent’ (or CAT) government, the proclaimed goal of these two new Pakatan Rakyat (PR) state governments. The relationship between the Opposition-led state governments and the federal departments of Education, Consumer Affairs, MIDA, and even Health, Tourism, Culture and Welfare based in the states remained tense after the change of state governments. For example, the lightning speed with which the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, a federal agency, conducted itself vis-Ã -vis allegations of corruption among PR politicians is a reminder of this polarisation between the federal and the state authorities (more on this in Part Four). Meanwhile, state governments have also boycotted activities organised by the federal departments. Since the federal departments have access to more funds than their state counterparts, they often manage their functions and projects to outdo those conducted by the latter, often in the same areas.
Even under the Madani government, the effects of these rivalries or silos often affect the common man. For Johor, the most prominent remains the standstill jams that usually happen at the Causeway crossings –which the Federal Government has repeatedly said it would resolve.
Yet, how has the civil service responded? KPISM president Ajeet Singh Gurbax Singh praised Onn Hafiz’s efforts for often visiting BSI and the Kompleks Sultan Abu Bakar (KSAB) in Gelang Patah to see the situation for himself but also said Onn Hafiz also needs to focus on the state’s people issues, especially involving the B40 group.
These complaints are because some union members feel uneasy about issues not being within Menteri Besar’s jurisdiction.
Tunku Ismail's arguments for greater autonomy and resources for Johor have cause—one has to look at the headlines to see why Johor has asked for more funds to resolve longstanding issues with public infrastructure and services, as seen with Hospital Sultanah Aminah and the roads in Johor.
This point about decentralisation is familiar. Penang (which coincidentally followed Johor’s move to request more revenue be retained by the state) was one of its great champions even before the Madani administration.
Critics of decentralisation have often pointed to the Constitution, but the Constitution itself is a living document—and given the material reality of state development, there is reason to consider how we should approach the federation.
The demands made by Tunku Ismail Sultan Ibrahim were necessary not only for the state of Johor but also for many other states facing the same problems. It is time to tweak the Federal-state power-sharing concept.
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